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1.1  Introduction 
Central banks have become increasingly transparent,  but just how 
transparent  should they be? Some central banks strive to reveal just 
about  everything  that is relevant;  this is the case of the Reserve  Bank  of 
New Zealand,  of the Bank  of Norway, and of Sweden's Riksbank.  Oth- 
ers are more circumspect;  they consider that there may be too much 
transparency,  see Bean (2005).1  Likewise, the academic  literature  is di- 
vided about  the welfare  case for full transparency.  Blinder  (1998)  argues 
that  central  banks  should be as transparent  as possible. As further  elab- 
orated  by Svensson (2005)  and Woodford  (2005),  the economic case for 
transparency  rests on the dominant role played by expectations of 
private  agents when they make decisions on prices,  spending, and pro- 
duction. When the main channels of monetary  policy operate through 
expected inflation,  long-term  interest  rates, asset prices, and exchange 
rates,  central  banks are most effective  when the private sector  fully un- 
derstands their intentions. Yet Cukierman  (2007) observes that trans- 
parency may backfire;  for instance,  when uncertainty  about the econ- 
omy, including  our understanding  of the economy,  is large  or because a 
high degree of transparency  can provide a distorted view of what the 
central  bank  knows and intends to achieve. 
At a very general  level, in an Arrow-Debreu  world with complete  mar- 
kets,  transparency  is always desirable  (Hellwig 2005).  In a more realistic 
setting,  second-best  arguments  are  bound to uncover  cases where some 
degree of opacity welfare-dominates  transparency.  The literature  has 
mostly focused on two generic departures  from market  completeness, 
building two influential  cases for some degree of central  bank  opacity. 
The first case for limiting transparency  starts with the constructive 
ambiguity argument initially advanced by Cukierman and Meltzer 10  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and Wyplosz 
(1986). The argument rests on two assumptions:  (a) only unanticipated 
money  matters (Kydland  and Prescott 1977), and (b) the central bank 
preferences are not precisely known by the public (Vickers 1986). Under 
these combined  assumptions,  some degree of opacity enhances  mone- 
tary policy effectiveness  because a fully transparent central bank cannot 
create surprises.2 These assumptions  have become less appealing. New 
Keynesian  models  do  not provide  support  to the only  unanticipated 
money matter view, already convincingly  criticized by McCallum (1995) 
and Blinder (1998). The view has also been undermined  by central bank 
practice; far from concealing  their preferences,  today's  central banks 
clearly specify their objectives, as is the case with the increasingly pop- 
ular inflation targeting strategy. 
Heterogeneous  information provides  the second  influential case for 
limited transparency. Morris and Shin (2002, 2005)  -  henceforth referred 
to as M&S  -  argue that central banks should not reveal all the informa- 
tion at their disposal.  Their argument  does  not appeal to the assump- 
tions of the constructive  ambiguity  literature. It rests instead on three 
different assumptions:  (a) the information available to both the central 
bank and the private sector is noisy; (b) the central bank's signals are seen 
by everyone in the private sector; and (c) private sector agents form fore- 
casts that are just as precise as possible but also as close as possible to the 
consensus  forecast  (a case  of strategic complementarity).  The last as- 
sumption,  which goes back to Keynes' celebrated beauty contest effect, 
is  meant  to  capture  the  basic  principle  that it is  relative  prices  that 
matter in competitive  markets. An implication of the beauty contest as- 
sumption  is that everyone  knows  that everyone  else observes the same 
central bank signals.  A consequence  is the common  knowledge  effect: 
relative to private information,  central bank signals  receive undue  at- 
tention in the sense that their impact will not just reflect their quality. It 
follows  that it may be desirable for the central bank to withhold  releas- 
ing its information when  the quality of its signals is not good  enough. 
This influential result has been shown not to be robust. Svensson  (2005) 
observes that, in practice, the quality of central bank signals is unlikely 
to be  sufficiently  poor  to justify  withholding  information.  Woodford 
(2005) observes  that the result occurs because M&S use a welfare func- 
tion that ignores the negative welfare effect of price dispersion. This gen- 
eral observation is further developed  in Hellwig  (2005) and Roca (2006). 
The present chapter extends  the analysis of information heterogene- 
ity in a number of directions. To start with,  most of the literature con- 
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(2007),  which explores  the optimum  degree  of transparency  by allowing 
the central bank to release its information to subgroups of private 
agents;  optimality  refers  to the size of the subgroups  that  receive  and act 
upon the information.  It seems to us that central  banks take great  pains 
to ensure  that  their  information  is strictly  not preferentially  distributed. 
Partial  transparency,  as we see it, refers  to the share  of information  that 
is released.  To  that effect,  we allow for more than one economic funda- 
mental  and to different  types of information. 
Publication  of the interest  rate  is now common practice  even though, 
as is well known, the Federal  Reserve  did not reveal its interest  rate  un- 
til 1994. That change represents  a major  step towards more transpar- 
ency. But the extensive attention devoted by central  bank watchers to 
policy announcements  suggests that  the interest  rate  acts  a crucial  signal 
that does not seem to have been studied so far.  In our model, the inter- 
est rate is one element of the information  set that a central  bank may 
decide to reveal. This allows us to consider at least three transparency 
regimes:  full opacity,  when the central  bank  does not release  any private 
information;  partial  transparency,  when the central  bank  only reveals  its 
interest  rate  decision;  and full transparency,  when the central  bank tells 
it all (i.e.,  also publishes its signals on the fundamentals). 
The interest  rate  is a special signal because,  unlike information  about 
the state  of the economy,  it can  be used by the central  bank  to affect  mar- 
ket expectations.  In other words, it is a manipulable  signal.3  We push 
this logic to its end and assume that the interest  rate  is only a signaling 
device and that  it does not play any direct  macroeconomic  role. Admit- 
tedly,  this is an extreme  assumption,  but it allows us to focus on this im- 
portant  aspect of interest  rate  decisions. 
Another  aspect of the literature  is that, typically,  the precision  of the 
heterogeneous  signals received by the central  bank and private sector 
agents  -  the inverse of signal variance  -  is assumed to be known with 
certainty.  Here we allow for imperfect  knowledge of signal precision 
and we find that  it makes an important  difference. 
As already mentioned, some controversies  about the desirability  of 
central  transparency  revolve around  the choice of the social welfare  cri- 
terion.  Even though some authors  derive this criterion  from  microfoun- 
dations, many assumptions creep in along the way. We deal with this 
problem  in two ways. First,  we adopt the general  social  welfare  function 
proposed by Hellwig (2005),  which encompasses some important  spe- 
cial  cases.  In  addition,  whenever  possible,  we derive results  that  are  gen- 
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Our  main interest  is not just to determine  which transparency  regime 
is best. Much of the emphasis is on how central  bank transparency,  or 
the lack thereof,  affects  the economy through  private  expectations.  The 
story we tell is one where the interest rate allows the central  bank to 
shape expectations.  By optimally choosing the interest  rate,  the central 
bank  can deal with the unavoidable  common  knowledge effect  in a way 
that  is welfare  enhancing.  That  tends to make  partial  transparency  pref- 
erable  to full transparency  because  in the latter  case the interest  rate  does 
not convey any additional  information  and cannot  be used by the cen- 
tral bank to shape private sector expectations.  If, however, the central 
bank  misestimates  the private  sector  signal precision,  its optimally  cho- 
sen interest  rate  may do more harm than good. This tends to make full 
transparency  the best regime choice. 
The  chapter  is organized  as follows. The  next section,  1.2,  presents  our 
model, which extends much of the literature  by allowing for any finite 
number  of economic  fundamentals.  Beyond  its generality,  this extension 
is needed as we assume throughout  that  the central  bank  optimally  sets 
the interest  rate;  with just  one fundamental,  the interest  rate  would fully 
reflect the central bank signal on that fundamental.  Since the central 
bank optimally  sets the interest  rate  to maximize  social welfare,  it must 
form a forecast  of the private sector information  precision.  Section 1.3 
considers the case when the precision of the central  bank and private 
sector information  is perfectly  known to both the central  bank and the 
private sector. In this case, partial transparency  dominates full trans- 
parency  -  unless all signals are drawn form the same distribution  -  be- 
cause the central  bank can adequately  influence  private sector  expecta- 
tions. In section 1.4,  the precision  of private  sector  signals is unknown  to 
the central  bank  but known to the private  sector.  As a result,  the central 
bank operates in a sort of fog, which reduces its ability to optimally 
shape private sector expectations.  Full transparency  may then be the 
most desirable  regime. We next allow for the private sector itself to be 
uncertain  about  its own signal  precision.  As shown in section  1.5,  this as- 
sumption does not radically  change the previous conclusions.  The last 
section briefly summarizes  our results and discusses limits and poten- 
tial extensions. 
1.2  The Model 
We follow the literature  on heterogeneous  information  as we imagine 
an  economy  populated  with a continuum  of agents,  each  of whom makes 
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of central  bank  transparency  is then assessed with a social  welfare  func- 
tion that  aggregates  individual  preferences.  Part  of the debate  about  the 
desirability  of central  bank  transparency  hinges on the form  of the indi- 
vidual utility  and social  welfare  functions.  We  borrow  the model of Hell- 
wig (2005),  who proposes a general utility function that encompasses 
many other  formulations.  For  illustration  purposes,  we interpret  private 
agent  actions  as setting  the price  of the goods that  they each produce. 
Since we assume that the central  bank may decide to announce its 
chosen interest  rate,  we need to allow for more  than  one fundamental.  If 
there were only one fundamental,  the interest rate decision would be 
fully revealing.  We therefore  assume that there  exist n fundamentals  0fc, 
k = 1, n > 2, which are independently,  identically,  and uniformly dis- 
tributed  so that  E(0fc)  = 0 Vfc  and Var(Qk)  is indefinite.4  Their  effect  on the 
price  level is given by A6 where 6 = (0ir  62,  . . . ,0n)'  and A is a conform- 
able vector.  The fundamentals  are meant to capture all the exogenous 
factors  that may affect  the economy while A represents  the true model 
of the economy.  We  assume that  this model is known to all, an unsavory 
assumption  that  is further  discussed in the concluding  section. 
1.2.1  The  Private Sector 
Each private agent i e  [0, 1] decides on action pi  -  which we illustra- 
tively call  the price  of his or  her  production  -  with two objectives:  match 
the imperfectly  known fundamental  A6 and stay close to other agents' 
action.  This description  of individual preferences  can be rationalized  in 
different  ways (see M&S  and Woodford [2005]).  Formally,  the prefer- 
ences of private agent i e  [0, 1] are described  by the following linear- 
quadratic  loss function: 
Li = (1 " r)(p{  -  A6)2 + r(Pi -  pf  - 
fcj  (p, 
-  pfdj  -  (1 -  r)k2(p-  A0)2 
where p.  is the (log) price  of the good from  producer  i and p = jj=0  Pjdj  is 
the aggregate  price  index. The two first  terms  are  a weighted average  of 
the cost of setting the price away from  its fundamental  value and of the 
cost of deviating from the average price. The relative weight re  [0, 1] 
thus captures  the degree of strategic  interaction  among producers;  it is 
the source of the beauty contest effect that lies at the heart of the com- 
mon knowledge effect  emphasized  by M&S.  The  last two terms,  with no 
sign restriction  on kx  < 1 and kv indicate  how much each agent internal- 
izes the dispersion of prices and aggregate volatility or mispricing.5 
These last two terms do not affect  producer  i's own decision since they 
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central  bank,  on the other  hand, can take  these externalities  into account 
when making  its own decision.  The  loss function  reduces  to the one used 
by M&S  when kx  = r and k2  = 0 and to the loss function assumed by 
Woodford  (2005)  when kx  = -r and k2  = 0.6  For  this reason,  for simplicity 
we will henceforth  assume that  ^ = 0. 
Taking  other  agents'  prices as given, agent f s optimal  choice is: 
p<  = (1 -  r)E'(A6)  + rE%p)  (1) 
where E1  is conditional  on the agent's  information  set. The  higher  the in- 
teraction  parameter  r the more producers  react to the expected aggre- 
gate price and the less they respond to the fundamentals.  When setting 
his or her own price p\ agent i must guess the aggregate price level, 
which depends on the prices set by all the other producers;  he or she 
must therefore  guess what the other  producers  will guess, which leads 
to infinite  iteration  on guesses of guesses. 
Each  private  agent is assumed to receive  his or her own idiosyncratic 
signals about  the fundamentals  0*.  These  signals are  unbiased  but noisy. 
The simplest representation  is to allow for an identically  and indepen- 
dently distributed  additive noise such that agent i's signal x[ about  fun- 
damental  6^  is: 
*i = 8*  + Tli  fc=l,...,n  EK)  = 0  Var(%)  = - 
Pit 
where £*,  the precision  of private  signal  xk,  is assumed  to be the same for 
all private  agents. 
Under  these assumptions,  we iterate  (1)  infinitely,  and denoting  E"  the 
71th  order  expectation,  we obtain  the optimal  pricing  decision: 
p' = (l-r)|;r»E'[E»(Ae)]/  (2) 
n=0 
which exists when 0 < r < 1. 
Without  any loss of generality,  we normalize  the fundamentals  6fc  so 
that  Ak  = lVk and A8 = Zj=10fc. 
1.2.2  The  Central  Bank 
Like each private agent, the central  bank receives some noisy but un- 
biased information  about the fundamentals: 
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where the noises ek  are independently and identically  distributed,  and 
are also independent of the private noise signals. The precision  of cen- 
tral  bank  signal x[ is ak7  The  central  bank  disposes of an instrument,  the 
short-term  interest  rate  R. In principle,  the interest  rate  has two effects: 
a macroeconomic  effect, which affects prices in addition to the funda- 
mentals 6^ and a signaling effect. We ignore the macroeconomic  effect 
because allowing for such a channel would  greatly complicate the 
model, precluding  a closed-form  solution.  The  assumption  is unrealistic 
but it has the advantage  of focusing  attention  on the information  content 
of the interest rate. It sets the present chapter as a complement to the 
large  literature  on optimal  monetary  policy,  which focuses  on the macro- 
economic  effect  of the interest  rate  with limited attention  to its informa- 
tion content.  Here  the central  bank  uses the interest  rate  purely  as a com- 
ponent of its communication  strategy.8  Of course,  the assumption  is not 
innocuous;  we will indicate  its implication  where it matters. 
The  central  therefore  makes  two decisions.  It decides on its communi- 
cation  strategy  and on the interest  rate.  Any signal  released  by the central 
bank  is public,  in the sense that  all private  agents  receive  it. Walsh  (2007), 
instead,  allows the central  bank to inform  subsets of the private sector; 
the optimal degree of transparency  concerns the proportion  of agents 
who are  informed.  Here  the optimal  degree  of transparency  concerns  the 
amount  of information  that  is simultaneously  released  to all agents. 
In deciding what information  to reveal, the central  bank maximizes 
social  welfare;  that  is, it minimizes ECB{.Lfdf  where the expectation  oper- 
ator  is conditioned  on the central  bank's  information  set. The social loss 
is evaluated  as the unconditional  average  of private  losses EJ^di.  Thus, 
the central  bank preferences  are well known and are the same as those 
of the private sector;  this eliminates the creative  ambiguity motive for 
limited  transparency.  We  will examine  the optimal  choice  of interest  rate 
R by the central  bank assuming that  it follows a linear  rule: 
K  = 5>A'  (3) 
it=i 
with a normalization  on R such that  IJL^  = 1. Note that,  to make  its de- 
cision, the central  bank must forecast  the p.'s,  which requires  guessing 
the private  sector  forecasts  (see [2]). 
1.3  Known Information  Precision 
We  consider  first  the case when the second moments  of both private  and 
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(Pfc  and ak,  respectively),  are known. In this case, there are three possible 
degrees  of transparency: full opacity -  denoted  OP  -  when  the central 
bank  does  not  reveal  anything;  partial transparency -  denoted  PT  - 
when  the central bank only reveals the optimally-chosen  interest rate; 
and  full  transparency -  denoted  FT  -  when  the  central bank  reveals 
both the interest rate and its signals fy. We limit our study to the binary 
choice of releasing all or none of the n signals. 
1.3.1  Full Opacity 
The opacity case is trivial given that the interest rate, which by assump- 
tion only has a signaling  role, is not published.  Each private agent re- 
ceives his or her own idiosyncratic signals x[, k = \,n  and has no further 
information. His or her best estimate of the aggregate price level is there- 
fore El(p) = 0 and, using (2), we have: 
P'  =  JU-  (4) 
The optimal price is the unweighted  sum of the signals. Part of the rea- 
son is that we have normalized  them so that A 6 = k  Qk.  The other reason, 
which will soon become clear, is that each agent receives only one signal 
about each fundamental  and thus has no better option than to take it at 
face value. The corresponding  social loss L°?  is shown  in the appendix. 
1.3.2  Partial  Transparency 
We now consider the case when the central bank reveals its interest rate 
R. Each private  agent  receives  two  kinds  of signals: the interest rate, 
which  they know  is optimally  set by the central bank according to (3), 
and its own  signals  xk. Applying  Bayes' rule, the optimum  forecast of 
fundamental  0fc  by agent i is: 
eW^(^mM) 
+ (i-^)4  (5) 
where: 
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Then the appendix shows  that (2) implies: 
with 
%=  1 -  Kl  -  25-iY*) 
' 
The common knowledge  effect is present; because each private agent 
observes R and knows that the others do as well, he or she tends to over- 
weight this signal. This is due to the beauty contest assumption  that each 
agent wishes  to set his or her price close to those of her competitors. In- 
deed, when the beauty contest assumption  is eliminated,  r = 0 and (pfc  = 
yk:  the weight  on R corresponds  exactly to optimal Bayesian signal ex- 
traction. When r > 0, cp*  > yk  and % increases with the interaction coeffi- 
cient r. See the appendix  for the corresponding  value  If1 of the social 
loss function. 
1.3.3  Full Transparency 
Full transparency occurs when the central bank reveals both the interest 
rate and all its signals 6fc.  In that case, the interest rate, which by (3) is just 
a linear combination of the signals, does not provide  any additional  in- 
formation and becomes a useless  instrument. Agent i now receives two 
signals about each fundamental  6*:  his or her own signal x\, with preci- 
sion pfc,  and the central bank signal % with precision ak.  Applying  Bayes 
rule, we have: 
where: 
-  "* 
Using (2), in equilibrium the price level is: 
P'  = £fii& + (l-9*)4l  (8) 
with 
-  (*fc 
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Here again, because  the information  released by the central bank is 
common knowledge,  it tends to receive an excessive weight in price set- 
ting. The appendix  displays  the associated social loss LFT. 
1.3.4  Welfare Comparisons 
Formally, we can evaluate the losses under the three regimes of interest. 
We can achieve a more general and more revealing result, however. Re- 
call that the central bank's choice of the interest rate only matters in the 
partial transparency regime. Under full opacity, the interest rate is not 
published  and does not affect the economy; under full transparency it 
does not bring any additional information. It turns out that, in the trans- 
parency regime, the central bank can always choose the interest rate so 
as to replicate the two other regimes, which implies that it can do better 
by optimizing. 
Comparing (4) and (6), we note that in the latter the coefficient of R is 
cp./juL-.  By choosing  the policy  coefficients  |x; such that cp;/|x; 
=  0, (6) re- 
duces to (4). Noting  that: 
(jA)_  ^  ">'  ￿￿￿￿  *ff  w 
^  ">'  [1  - r(l  - !»».,  -,,)]  1-.,^- 
+ 
-j 
we see that cp;/|x; 
= 0 when  |x;/P; 
= 0. Since I^=1  |x; 
= 1, we can eliminate 
any one of the policy parameters, say |xw,  and the condition becomes: 
;=1\P;  £(i-  rVf"0-  PnJ  Pn 
(10) 
;=1\P;  PnJ  Pn 
When the P;s  are not all equal, 1  / P; 
- 1  / Pw  * 0 f  or some values of P;  (we 
consider the symmetric case P, = 
P; Vf, ; below),  there exists an infinite 
number of combinations of the policy parameters |±;  such that (p;/ji; 
= 0. 
This means that a partially transparent central bank can always  set the 
interest rate in a way that mimics the opacity case. It follows  that, when 
it optimizes  the choice of |x  ., a partially transparent central bank can al- 
ways do at least as well as an opaque central bank. 
When p. = 
P;  \/i,j,  a partially transparent central bank can still mimic 
an opaque central bank. Since their various signals have the same preci- 
sion, Bayesian private agents give the same weight  in their forecasts to 
each fundamental.  In that sense,  the fundamentals  are equivalent  and 
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late private expectations.9 Still, the central bank can set jjl7 
=  ±00, which 
makes the interest rate uninformative  (this is the solution  to [10] when 
P; 
- > PM  for all ; = 1, n -  1). In this case, reproducing  the opacity regime 
is optimal and the two regimes become  equivalent  as far as welfare  is 
concerned. 
We can apply  the same logic to the comparison  between  the partial 
and full transparency regimes. Indeed,  (6) reduces to (8) when  |xfc/|x; 
= 
cpj/cfy,  which implies Z^ix/ix^cfy 
= (p*.10  Since I%=1n>k  =  1, this condition 
determines  a unique  set of policy  parameters [Lk.  It follows  that a par- 
tially transparent central bank can always choose the interest rate to re- 
produce  the outcome  under full transparency. When it optimizes,  the 
partially transparent central bank stands  to achieve  at least the social 
welfare reached under full transparency, and it can possibly  do better. 
Proposition  1. When the precision  of central bank  and private sector infor- 
mation is known, partial transparency  dominates  both  opacity and  full trans- 
parency.  This result holds  for any loss  function (which preserves  the price set- 
ting) and any number  of  fundamentals. 
The result is very general. It is independent  of the welfare  function 
since we do not even need to specify optimal policy under partial trans- 
parency. It also holds independently  of the relative precision of central 
bank and private signals.  It remains valid  even  if the central bank re- 
veals only a subset of the signals %k  that it has received.11 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows.  Under either opacity 
or full transparency, the interest rate does  not convey  any signal. The 
central bank can use the interest rate to optimally manipulate private ex- 
pectations only in the partially transparency regime. Relative to opacity, 
it uses the interest rate to enlarge the private sector information set, but 
at the same time it creates a common  knowledge  effect, which  could 
have adverse welfare consequences.  However,  a shrewd  (i.e., optimiz- 
ing) central bank can take this into account and make the interest rate a 
useless signal through infinite interest rate volatility so as to achieve the 
same  outcome  as  under  opacity.  Similarly, in  the  case  of  full  trans- 
parency, when  the central bank reveals  all its information,  it creates a 
distortionary common  knowledge  effect with no signaling  instrument 
left to offset it. Under the partial transparency regime, revealing the in- 
terest rate is also the source of a common  knowledge  effect; here again, 
a shrewd central bank can minimize  the distortion through its choice of 
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The case when p, = P;  Vi,  ; further  illustrates  the role of the assump- 
tion that the interest rate does not play any macroeconomic  role. We 
have seen that  the optimal  solution  for  the central  bank  is to set [Lk  -  ±<». 
In effect,  the central  bank  creates  maximum  volatility  to make the inter- 
est rate uniformative.  Obviously, such a policy would be enormously 
costly if the interest rate had a macroeconomic  effect and a partially 
transparent  central  bank  most likely  would trade  off the macroeconomic 
and communication  effects. 
13.5  The  Special Case of Full Symmetry 
As an illustration  and for further  reference,  we consider  the case where 
ak  = a and $k  = p  Vfc,  i.e. signal  precision  is the same for  each  of the n fun- 
damentals.  Since we already  assume that A0 = X£=1  6^,  the full symme- 
try assumption  makes the signals equivalent,  yet distinct.  This simplifi- 
cation does not affect the opacity and full transparency  regimes but it 
allows us to characterize  optimal monetary  policy in the partial  trans- 
parency  regime.  This is why, in the rest of the chapter,  we will limit our 
study to the neighborhood  of this full symmetry  setup. 
Under partial  transparency,  the price level is given by (6). Using the 
constraint  l!*=1  juuf  = 1, we find: 
=  <**  fL  ￿￿￿￿  wA  1 
P = 
[a + (1 -  r)p]Zj.lM|  £\ 
￿￿￿￿ 
[a + (1 " r)P](I,"=1^2)  J" 
The appendix shows that the central  bank optimizes by setting |x£ = 
1/n.  Thus,  Vfc  = 1, n if the following second order  condition  is satisfied: 
(l-fc1)a  + (l-r)(l-2A:1)p>0.  (11) 
Then  equilibrium  prices are: 
a  »  p(l -  r) 
which are the same as under full transparency  when R = (l/nJZO^.  It fol- 
lows that L^dx*)  = If7 under symmetry,  where |x* = (1/n,  . . . , 1/n). 
To  understand  this result, recall  that we have normalized  the funda- 
mentals so that A0 = 6fc.  The assumption a^.  = a and Pfc  = p Vfc  implies 
that, when they make their forecasts, both the central bank and the 
private sector attribute  the same weight 1/n to all signals. It is natural 
therefore  for the central  bank to choose R = (l/n)Z6fc.  Using Bayes'  rule, 
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has received the signals Qk  = (R/n) Vfc.  This prevents the central  bank 
from manipulating  private sector expectations  fundamental  by funda- 
mental. Put differently,  when the central  bank is fully transparent,  the 
private  agents  use this information  to set their  prices  p'  by combining  the 
signals 6*,  k = 1, n revealed by the central  bank as if (12) applies with 
When  the second order  condition  (11)  is not satisfied,  the loss function 
is minimized when the central  bank sets juufc  = ±o°  with signs such that 
|xfc  = 1. Denote as |x°°  the corresponding  vector  of policy parameters.  The 
partially  transparent  central  bank  creates  maximum  interest  rate  volatil- 
ity to remove any information  value from its policy decision. As a con- 
sequence,  the partial  transparency  and opacity regimes are identical,  as 
previously  noted. The fact that optimized partial  transparency  delivers 
opacity also establishes that opacity welfare-dominates full  trans- 
parency.  Summarizing,  we have established  the following: 
When (1 -  k,)a + (1 -  r)(l -  2^)0 > 0:  LPT(n*)  = LFT  < L°r 
When (1 -  fc>  + (1 -  r)(l -  2fc2)P  < 0:  L^00)  = L°r  < LFT. 
The second order condition plays an important  role. It involves all 
of the model's parameters  and can be rewritten  as a/p > -(1 -  r)[(l - 
2fca)/(l  -fcj)].  Intuitively,  it is satisfied  when the relative  precision  of cen- 
tral  bank signals a/p  is high enough, when the common knowledge ef- 
fect is moderate because private agents are not too reactive to each 
other's  prices,  and when price dispersion  is perceived as a negative ex- 
ternality  (kr  < 0) or a relatively  low positive externality  (^ > 0 but not 
too large).  It is always satisfied  when kx  < 1/2. 
The  combined  role  of the relative  precision  of central  bank  signals and 
of private  sector  reactivity  is illustrated  by previous results from in the 
literature.  As noted in section 1.2.1,  the welfare  function  chosen  by M&S 
corresponds  to fc1  = r. In this case the second order  condition  is satisfied 
and full transparency  welfare-dominates  opacity when a/p  > 2r -  1, 
while opacity is the preferable  regime in the opposite case. The welfare 
function  advocated  by Woodf  ord (2005)  corresponds  to fca  = -r, in which 
case the second order  condition  is always satisfied  and opacity is never 
desirable. 
The  role  of kx  is further  illustrated  as follows. We  have seen that,  when 
it sets the interest  rate under partial  transparency,  the central  bank can 
reproduce  the full transparency  outcome,  and that  it can even do better 
for social  welfare,  which implies LFT  > LPT.  We  can make a similar,  sym- 22  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and  Wyplosz 
metric  argument  regarding  the private sector.  Under full transparency, 
when the central  bank  releases  all its information,  the private  sector  can 
always choose the same prices (6) as under partial  transparency,  and it 
can  do better  by optimizing.  This  does not imply that  U7 < If7, however, 
because  private  agents  cannot  react  to the aggregate  price  dispersion  ex- 
ternality  since they are atomistic.  The  best that  they can individually  do 
is not socially optimal,  while the central  bank internalizes  the external- 
ity and delivers the social optimum. This is why, in the end, as long as 
the externality  is not strongly  welfare-increasing,  that  is, when kx  < 1  /2, 
we have If7 > If7  , with U7 = If7 when kx  = 0. A conjecture,  which is con- 
firmed  below, is that  the difference  in losses U7 - If7, which is nonnega- 
tive, is proportional  to k\. 
1.4  Private  Information  Precision Unknown to the Central  Bank 
So far  we have followed the existing  literature  in assuming  that  the vari- 
ances of the signals received by individual private agents and by the 
central  bank are known. We now allow for information  precision  to be 
imperfectly  known. Specifically,  we assume that the central  bank infor- 
mation  precision  ak  about signal Qk,  for k -  \,n,  is known to all but that 
the private sector information  precision Pfc  is unknown to the central 
bank. Put differently,  we assume that the private sector  knows its own 
precision  but has no way to reveal it to the central  bank. 
The  justification  for this assumption  is that the central  bank forecasts 
are closely monitored  and evaluated  by both the central  bank itself and 
the private  sector;  presumably  the central  bank  has the resources  needed 
to evaluate  its forecasting  performance  and has no reason  to hide its re- 
sults from its watchers.  On the other hand, the central  bank cannot  ob- 
serve  the myriad  of private  sector  forecasts  well enough to infer  their  pre- 
cision.12  In the next section, we will consider  the case when the private 
information  precision  is also unknown to the private  sector  itself. 
To  keep the analysis tractable,  for all signals 9*,  k = l,n,  we will con- 
sider small deviations from the symmetric  case studied in section 1.3.5: 
<**  = « + uk  (13) 
where uk  and vk  are zero-mean random variables  whose variances  are 
unknown.13  While ak is public knowledge, we  assume that private 
agents know $k,  which is the same for every agent. In contrast,  the cen- 
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?;=&  + *;  (14) 
where v'k,  k = 1, n, are independent random variables  with zero mean 
and variances T\v\. The proportionality  term Fk  represents a sort of 
"fog"  under which the imperfectly  informed  central  bank operates.  Be- 
cause of this fog, the central  bank  will be unable to choose the same op- 
timal interest rate as was the case in the previous section. Instead of 
choosing the policy parameters  |x = (|xlr  . . . ,|±N),  it will set |x' = (|xj,  . . . , 
ixj^),  which is socially suboptimal. 
1.4.1  Transparency  Regimes 
When the central  bank does not know the precision of private signals, 
we can identify four transparency  regimes:  (1) full opacity;  (2) interest 
rate (partial)  transparency  (RPT)  when the central  bank only reveals its 
interest rate decision R; (3) interest rate and precision (partial)  trans- 
parency  (RPPT)  when the central  bank  reveals  both the interest  rate  and 
its estimates P' of private sector precision; (4) full transparency  (FT) 
when it also reveals its own signals 8 = (6a,  . . . ,6J. As before, in our 
setup, the interest  rate  decision  is irrelevant  in the polar  regimes  of opac- 
ity and full transparency.  It follows that  the situation  under opacity and 
full transparency  is the same irrespective  of whether  private  sector  pre- 
cision is known or not. 
In section 1.3, partial transparency  always welfare-dominates full 
transparency  because the central  bank  can use the interest  rate  signal to 
partially offset the common knowledge effect. Does this result carry 
through  to the case when the central  bank does not know the precision 
of private signals?  Not necessarily  so. Indeed, because the interest  rate 
decision will now rely upon erroneous  knowledge, it may be that full 
transparency  provides a better  outcome  than  either  partial  transparency 
regime. 
Informally,  we know that  when all precision  is known, LPT(|x*)  < LFT. 
The only difference  between partial  transparency  when all precision  is 
known and RPPT  when private  sector  precision  is not known to the cen- 
tral  bank is that,  in the latter  case, the central  bank uses incorrect  preci- 
sion estimates (3'  = (pa,  . . . , pN)  to set the interest  rate.  Thus, it is likely 
to choose a suboptimal  jjl'  = (jxj,  . . . , ^)  and LRPPT(jx;)  > L^p*). Thus, 
we cannot  directly  compare  L^^di/) and IF. Yet,  for the same reason  as 
before,  we know that there exists a jisuch that, if chosen by the central 
bank, would replicate  the full transparency  regime outcome (i.e., that 
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Irppt  ^t*} < jjt  However,  since the central  bank  does not know private 
sector  precision,  it can only choose |x'*  by sheer luck. In fact,  if the cen- 
tral  bank is sufficiently  off the mark  -  if the fog is thick  -  it will in fact 
choose |ljl'  such that  LRPPT(|x')  > IF7.  We  now prove this conjecture. 
1.4.2  Welfare  Comparisons 
Interest Rate and Precision Partial  Transparency  (RPPT)  Versus Full 
Transparency  (FT)  We know from section 1.3.5  that  when precision  is 
known, under symmetry,  in the partial  transparency  regime the central 
bank optimal  policy is to set jjijf  = 1/n VA:  when the second order  condi- 
tion (11)  is satisfied.  In the neighborhood  of the symmetric  equilibrium, 
we assume that the optimal  policy parameters  will be close to |x£  : 
where mk  is presumed to be small. 
If it imperfectly  estimates private sector precision, the central  bank 
chooses instead [i'k  = 1/n + m'k.  The resulting  unconditional  expectation 
of the loss is Ell™*7  (jjl')].  The appendix shows that Ell™^1)}  > £FT 
when: 
|- 
+ (1 -  r)(l -  2Jtj) 
V 2<M  ~ !)  (15) 
where 
p2  =  p  ￿￿￿￿  ^-  L  ￿￿￿￿ 
is the relevant  aggregate  measure of the fog effect on central  bank pol- 
icy decisions. The appendix also shows that a/p + (1 - r)(l - 2^) > 0 
when the second order  condition (11)  is satisfied. 
Thus the presence of fog, the fact that the central  bank is uncertain 
about private signal precision, may reverse the welfare ranking  of the 
partial and full transparency  regimes. When the central  bank knows 
private  information  precision,  it can  optimally  choose the interest  rate  to 
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private sector information,  the interest  rate that it chooses is no longer 
socially  optimal.  Full transparency,  which makes the interest  rate  signal 
useless, becomes more desirable  when the fog is thick  enough. 
To  interpret  (15),  note that  when there  is no price dispersion  external- 
ity,  (i.e.,  when kx  = 0), the threshold  F = 0 and the slightest  degree of fog 
is enough to make FT the best communication  regime. We have seen 
that,  when the private  sector  signal precision  is known, partial  and full 
transparency  deliver the same welfare  when kx  = 0. Obviously,  the pres- 
ence of fog, which leads the central  bank  to make  a mistake  when setting 
the interest  rate,  worsens the situation  under partial  transparency. 
When the price  dispersion  externality  is present  so that  kx  =£  0, partial 
transparency  becomes desirable  because, by manipulating  the interest 
rate,  the central  bank  partially  internalizes  the externality.  The fog must 
be thick  enough to make FT  welfare-superior.  The threshold  F increases 
with IJfcJ  when kx  > 0 and declines  with |fcj  when kx  < 0. When  fca  > 0, the 
price dispersion  externality  raises welfare;  the common knowledge ef- 
fect becomes increasingly  undesirable  as kx  becomes larger  and interest 
manipulation  under partial  transparency  stands to raise welfare. Con- 
versely, when /q < 0, the price dispersion externality  reduces welfare; 
the common knowledge effect is good, as in Woodford  (2005),  and FT 
dominates  even for low levels of fog. 
The threshold  F increases  with a/p,  the relative precision of central 
bank signals. Quite intuitively,  a better  informed central  bank is better 
able to use the interest rate to manipulate private expectations. The 
threshold  also increases  with the degree r of reactivity  of private  agents 
to each other expectations. Indeed, a higher degree of reactivity in- 
creases  the common  knowledge effect  that  the central  bank  can  partially 
offset when it sets the interest  rate. 
The following proposition  summarizes  our results for the case when 
the second order  condition  is satisfied: 
Proposition  2. When  the central  bank  does not know the precision  of private 
sector  signals and when the relative  information  precision  of the central  bank  is 
large enough  for the second order  condition (11) to hold,  full  transparency  is 
more  desirable  than interest rate and precision  partial transparency  when the 
fog effect  is large  enough. The  threshold  is lower,  and  full transparency  is more 
desirable: 
•  the less precise  is relative  central  bank  information 
•  the less reactive  are  private  agents to each  other  expectations 26  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and Wyplosz 
•  the stronger  is the price  dispersion  externality  when it reduces  welfare 
•  the weaker  is the price  dispersion  externality  when it increases  welfare. 
When the second order  condition (11)  is not satisfied,  the best option 
for the central  bank is to let the policy parameters  [ik  become arbitrarily 
large in absolute value (i.e., to mimic the opacity regime). This is the 
same result  as when precision  is known (see section 1.3.5).  The  only dif- 
ference is that, when it is mistaken about private sector precision, the 
central  bank does not achieve what it wishes, which makes RPPT  less 
desirable.  But  this is a second order  effect  compared  to the difference  be- 
tween opacity and full transparency.14 
Thus,  we reach  the following result: 
When (1 -  k,)a + (1 -  r)(l -  2Jt,)p  < 0:  L<»>  -  E[LRPPT]  < LFT, 
which can be summarized  as follows: 
Proposition  3. When  the central  bank  does not know the precision  of private 
sector  signals,  full opacity is the most desirable  communication  strategy when 
the second  order  condition (11) does not hold. 
A comment is in order.  The proposition favors opacity even though 
we stated that  Lop  -  EIL*"*7].  In section 1.3.5,  under full symmetry  when 
ak  = a and P*  = P Vfc,  the optimal  choice of the policy parameters  is |xfc  = 
±oo  and L°p  = E[LRPPT].  In the neighborhood  of full symmetry,  the opti- 
mal parameters  become arbitrarily  large in absolute values (jxfc  - > ±°°) 
but they remain  finite.  We can only state that EfL*^  is close to LT We 
do not examine  further  whether E[LRPPT]  is larger  or smaller  than If  be- 
cause this solution depends on the unrealistic  assumption that the in- 
terest  rate  plays no macroeconomic  role. 
Interest  Rate  Partial  Transparency  (RPT)  Versus  Interest  Rate  and Pre- 
cision Partial  Transparency  (RPPT)  In  both cases the central  bank  sets 
the interest  rate  optimally  based on incorrect  information  about  private 
sector precision.  Under RPT,  the private sector does not know the cen- 
tral  bank's  estimates  of its precision.  As a consequence  its estimate  of the 
optimally chosen policy parameters,  denoted jl =  (p^,  . . . jlj,  differs 
from the parameters  |i' actually  chosen by the central  bank.  In order  to 
set his or her price, each agent must therefore  estimate  both pl^  and the 
central  bank  signals Qk,  k = \,n but he or she does not observe  ji. In order 
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interest  rate  R with his or her guess of the central  bank's  belief about  his 
or her own signal precision, given by (14). We assume that he or she 
makes  the following guess: 
k = p*  + vk  + vk 
with vk  centered  around  zero and of variance  Pi;£. This additive uncer- 
tainty captures the assumption that the central bank misestimates 
private  sector  precision  and that  the private  sector  observes  this estimate 
with a noise. The  central  bank  fog Fk  generates  a private  sector  fog Fk.15 
The appendix shows that, when the second order condition is satis- 
fied, the unconditional  expectation  of the social  loss under  RPT  is higher 
than the unconditional  expectation  of the social loss under RPPT: 
E[LRpT(iL',iL)]>E[L«™(iL')].  (16) 
This result  naturally  reflects  the spreading  of uncertainty  under RPT, 
which does not occur  under RPPT.  In  both regimes,  the central  bank  op- 
timally  uses the interest  rate  to fashion  private  sector  expectations  but its 
ignorance  of private  sector  precision  leads it to choose a socially subop- 
timal  set of policy parameters  \l' . Under  RPPT,  the private  sector  can  cor- 
rectly  estimate |i' because the central  bank has revealed its estimate (3'; 
under RPT,  the private sector makes the imprecise inference P of (3', 
which leads to socially suboptimal  prices. 
When the second order  condition  is not satisfied  and the optimal  pa- 
rameters  |xfc  -> ±oo,  as before,  we can show in the same way that (16)  still 
holds, for the same reason. 
Proposition 4. When  the  central  bank  does  not  know  the  precision  of  private 
signals,  if it publishes  its interest  rate,  it is always  preferable  that  it also  reveals 
its assessment  of  private  signal  precision,  even  though  it is erroneous. 
Finally,  the analysis  of the opacity  regime is essentially  the same as in 
section 1.3. When the second order condition (11)  holds, partial  trans- 
parency  -  both RPT and RPPT  -  welfare-dominates opacity for the 
same reason.  When (11)  does not hold, it is possible for the central  bank 
under  either  partial  transparency  regime  to let ^-^±00,  which delivers 
an outcome close to that achieved under the opacity regime. And here 
again,  an optimizing  central  bank  can do better  than that,  unless the fog 
is thick  and the central  bank's  optimal  choice is badly flawed. We  do not 
pursue this comparison  further  because the policy under partial  trans- 
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est rate highly volatile, which we view as an unrealistic  implication  of 
our assumption  that the interest  rate  plays no macroeconomic  role. 
1.4.3  Discussion 
The literature  on monetary  policy under perfect  information  has so far 
focused on uncertainty  about the economic fundamentals.  Section 1.3 
essentially generalizes that literature  to the case of an indefinite num- 
ber of fundamentals to show that, indeed, information  heterogeneity 
leads to a common knowledge effect. In the present section, we have 
added a second level of uncertainty,  which concerns  the precision  of the 
signals. 
Central  bank information  therefore  is now multidimensional.  While 
poor information  about the signals creates  the common knowledge ef- 
fect, poor information  about private  signal precision  generates  a fog ef- 
fect that  reduces  the effectiveness  of the central  bank.  While  the welfare 
effects of signal uncertainty are ambiguous (as reflected in the con- 
trasted results of M&S  and Woodford),  the fog effect unambiguously 
makes full transparency  more desirable.  The intuition  is clear.  The cen- 
tral bank uses the interest rate to affect private sector expectations  to 
deal with the common knowledge effect and to correct  for the price  dis- 
persion  externality.  When  its understanding  of private  sector  pricing  de- 
cision is flawed  because  it misestimates  private  sector  precision,  the cen- 
tral  bank  better  contributes  to welfare  by not using the interest  rate  as a 
signal. This is achieved by revealing directly  all the information  rather 
than a partial  summary  as with the interest  rate. 
A less obvious intuition  is that a central  bank that is mistaken  about 
private sector signal precision  should truthfully  reveal its mistaken  be- 
liefs. The  reason  is that  the central  bank  uncertainty  about  private  sector 
signal precision  has two effects:  it leads to a socially  suboptimal  interest 
rate  decision,  the fog effect,  and it forces  the private  sector  to take  into ac- 
count  the central  bank  mistaken  beliefs,  which leads to another  fog effect, 
which results in socially suboptimal  pricing decisions. Removing this 
second fog effect  through  full transparency  can  be welfare  enhancing. 
Yet  it is not always the case that more transparency  is always better 
than  less. When  its own signal  precision  is relatively  low  -  when the sec- 
ond order  condition  (11)  is not satisfied  -  it may make  sense for the cen- 
tral  bank  to be fully opaque  and  not to reveal  its interest  rate.  In  that  case, 
if the central  bank  cannot  hide its interest  rate  decision,  it becomes opti- 
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tioned, crucially  depends on our assumption that the interest rate has 
only a signaling  role;  that is, it has no macroeconomic  effect. 
1.5  Private  Information  Precision Unknown to Both the Central 
Bank and the Private  Sector 
We  now extend the previous case to the situation  where neither  the cen- 
tral  bank nor the private  sector  know the precision  of private sector  in- 
formation  p. This  may be an assumption  more  germane  to the idea of in- 
formation  heterogeneity.  The  underlying  view is that  the central  bank  is 
very carefully  monitored  and devotes substantial  resources  to collecting 
and processing information.  On the other hand, the private sector is 
composed of a large number of agents with limited resources and 
among which information  collection and processing is a strategic in- 
strument,  hence rather  secretive. 
In line with the previous treatment  of imperfect  information,  we con- 
sider the situation  in the neighborhood  of the symmetric  case, see (13), 
and we assume that  each private  sector  agent  believes that  her informa- 
tion precision  for fundamental  0fc  is: 
where the error  terms are independently distributed  with zero mean 
and variance  G]p\  for  all k = 1, n. The  assumptions  about  the central  bank 
assessment of P are the same as in the previous section (see [14]).  The 
transparency  regimes  -  publishing only the interest  rate (RPT)  or both 
the interest  rate and the central  bank beliefs about private sector  preci- 
sion (RPPT)  -  are also the same. As before,  the polar regimes of opacity 
and full transparency  are not affected  by the uncertainty  about signal 
precision  because  under either  regime there  is no (information)  role for 
the interest  rate.  We  assume Knightian  uncertainty;  that is, that the cen- 
tral  bank  knows the existence  of this fog but not the variances  G%u2k.  It  fol- 
lows that the central  bank still chooses \Lrk  = 1/n + mk  when the second 
order  condition (11)  is satisfied,  otherwise  it sets |x -» |x°°. 
1.5.1  Interest  Rate and Precision  Partial Transparency  (RPPT) 
versus  Full Transparency  (FT) 
We proceed by looking at a difference  in differences:  we compare the 
difference  of social losses EfL^dx')  - LFT\btiai  suffered under the RPPT 
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central bank and the private sector with  the corresponding  difference 
E[lRppr^r)  _ 
I/7]^^  when it is only the central bank that is ill-informed. 
When the second order condition (11) is satisfied, the appendix shows 
that: 
E[L*™{il') -  L"]^  -  E[LRP^')  - 
L^CBonly 
=  (17) 
a + (1 -  r)B -  3k,a  n-\ 
where G is a measure of private fog, similar to the measure F of central 
bank fog. Equation (17) shows  that the impact of private sector uncer- 
tainty about its own precision depends  on the sign of a + (1 - r) p - 3/CjCt. 
Note  first that the central bank fog does  not affect this difference in 
differences: the two fog effects are additive. We exploit this result as fol- 
lows. In the FT regime, the central bank does not make any useful deci- 
sion, so the only optimizer is the price-setting private sector. In the RPPT 
transparency regime, both the central bank and the private sector opti- 
mize, but the additivity result allows us to interpret (17) by reasoning as 
if the only optimizer in this regime is the central bank. 
A first intuition  from (17) is that the fog effect reduces the effective- 
ness of the optimizer  agent. We already saw in section 1.4 that the cen- 
tral bank is less  effective  when  it optimizes  under  uncertainty  about 
private sector signal precision; full transparency, when the interest rate 
becomes  a useless  signal, tends to be welfare-dominant.  When private 
agents also suffer from their own fog effect, they are less good at setting 
prices and this effect tends to make full transparency less desirable. The 
effect is captured in (17) by the term a + (1 - r) 0 > 0. 
In order to interpret the remaining term -3fcaa,  we need to remember 
the result from section  1.3.5 that the price dispersion  externality  cap- 
tured by fcj  favors partial transparency because the central bank can in- 
ternalize this component  of social welfare. When fca  = 0 and there is no 
externality, the presence  of a private fog effect unambiguously  makes 
RPPT more  socially  desirable  than  FT. This conclusion  is  reinforced 
when kx  < 0 (i.e., when price dispersion is a social bad), because the cen- 
tral bank is the optimizer  under  RPPT (in the sense  indicated  previ- 
ously).  When kx >  0, we face a trade-off. Now  the price dispersion  ex- 
ternality is a social good, which the central bank takes into account as it 
makes  its  decision  under  interest  rate  and  precision  partial  trans- 
parency. But the private sector fog effect also leads to more price disper- 
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certainty  -  the central  bank cannot take this additional effect into ac- 
count  under  RPPT,  which favors  the FT  regime.  When  kx  is large  enough, 
this latter  effect  dominates.  Note that  the role of the price  dispersion  ex- 
ternality  is stronger  the more precise is the central  bank  -  the larger  is 
a -  because a highly precise central  bank has a stronger influence on 
private  sector  pricing  decisions. 
For  completeness,  we briefly  mention  the case when the second order 
condition (11)  is not satisfied.  As in section 1.4, the central  bank makes 
the interest  rate uninformative  by choosing |x close to |x°°.  Since the fog 
effects are of second order of magnitude, opacity remains the best 
regime: 
Lop  ^ e[Lrpfi]  < If. 
1.5.2  Interest  Rate Partial Transparency  versus  Interest  Rate and 
Precision  Partial Transparency 
The appendix  shows that,  when the second order  condition  (11)  is satis- 
fied, the central  bank  optimally  sets jljLj  -  1/n and the result  of section 1.4 
still holds: RPPT  dominates RPT.  Indeed, the existence of a private sec- 
tor fog does not affect  the central  bank behavior.  Facing  Knightian  un- 
certainty  about private sector fog, it still chooses policy parameters  |x'; 
under  RPT,  the private  sector  still infers  that  the central  bank  has chosen 
p.,  which leads to the welfare  reducing  bias previously  described.  When, 
in addition,  it is subjected  to its own fog, the private  sector  sets socially 
suboptimal  prices.  The  resulting  adverse  effect  on welfare is similar  un- 
der RPT  and RPPT;  whatever difference  exists, it is small relative  to the 
bias due to the central  bank fog. 
The same reasoning  applies when (11)  is not satisfied. 
1.5.3  Welfare  Implications 
The previous analysis is summarized  as follows for the case when the 
second order  condition (11)  holds: 
Proposition  5. Comparing  the situation when the private sector knows its 
own signal precision  and when it does not, and still assuming that the central 
bank  does not know  private  sector  signal precision: 
•  interest rate transparency  is always welfare-dominated  by interest rate and 
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•  the welfare case  for interest rate and precision partial transparency  is en- 
hanced  when the price  dispersion  externality  reduces  welfare 
•  the welfare  case  for full transparency  is enhanced  when the price dispersion 
externality raises welfare,  especially when the (actual) relative  precision  of 
central bank information  is relatively large relative to private sector infor- 
mation. 
In the end, private  sector  fog does not play as strong  a qualitative  role 
as central  bank  fog. The  reason  is that,  through  the interest  rate,  the cen- 
tral  bank  plays a signaling  role,  while the private  sector  only make  pric- 
ing decisions. The central bank's signaling role implies a common 
knowledge effect,  which is partly  welfare  reducing,  because  of too much 
attention, and partly welfare-increasing,  because it reduces price dis- 
persion. The resulting trade-off  remains unchanged even in the pres- 
ence of private  sector  fog. 
Finally,  for completeness, we note that the conclusions previously 
reached  regarding  the opacity regime remain  valid. When (11) is veri- 
fied, a partially transparent  central  bank can always do better than a 
fully opaque one. When (11)  does not hold, opacity is optimal. 
1.6  Conclusions 
Information  heterogeneity among private agents has emerged as a 
key consideration  in the literature  on central  bank transparency.  Infor- 
mation heterogeneity  leads to the common knowledge effect whereby 
private agents attach  a strong weight to central  bank signals not neces- 
sarily  because the central  bank is well informed  but because its signals 
are  widely observed.  Knowing  that  other  agents will respond to central 
bank signals give these signals an importance  that exceeds their preci- 
sion. This effect can make transparency  desirable  or not, depending on 
the assumed social welfare function. 
The  present  chapter  extends  the literature  in four  directions.  First,  it al- 
lows for more than one economic fundamental.  Second, it adds the in- 
terest  rate  to the list of signals that the central  bank can reveal.  Third,  it 
extends  the range  of uncertainties  that  matter.  So far  the literature  has fo- 
cused on uncertainty  about  the economic  fundamentals,  which are sup- 
posed to be estimated  with known precision;  here we also allow for un- 
certainty  about  precision.  Fourth,  it derives  results  that  are  general  in the 
sense that  they do not depend on any particular  social  welfare  criterion. 
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Allowing for more than one economic fundamental shows that the cen- 
tral bank communication policy rests on exploiting the differences in the 
stochastic patterns of the corresponding signals. A contrario, when all sig- 
nals are drawn from the same known distribution,17  which may differ be- 
tween the central bank and the private sector signals, any partial release 
by the central bank of its own signals (e.g., by announcing the optimally 
chose interest rate), amounts to releasing all signals. Then the central bank 
is left with a binary choice of transparency regimes, full opacity or full 
transparency. The multiplicity of independent  signal fundamentals pro- 
vides the central bank with a wider menu of transparency regimes. 
The use of the interest rate as a communication  tool has not been ex- 
amined so far, we believe. Here we go to the polar situation when the in- 
terest rate is only a communication  tool. Full transparency occurs when 
the central bank faithfully reports all the signals that it has received. Full 
transparency, therefore, is a passive  regime, since it deprives  the inter- 
est rate from any additional  information  value.  In contrast, with  less 
than full transparency, the central bank can use the interest rate to shape 
private sector expectations.  This makes the interest rate a strategic sig- 
nal.18  In particular, the central bank can optimally set the interest rate to 
mitigate the common  knowledge  effect when  it is detrimental to social 
welfare or to exploit it when it enhances social welfare. 
When signal precision is known, we essentially  reproduce the results 
previously  established  in the literature, although  we  cast them  more 
generally using the social welfare function proposed by Hellwig  (2005), 
which encompasses  the special cases proposed  by M&S and by Wood- 
ford (2005). In fact, in this case, we establish results that are independent 
of the specification of the welfare function. Partial transparency, defined 
as  the publication  of  the  optimally  set  interest  rate, dominates  both 
opacity  and full transparency. The reason is that opacity  prevents  the 
central bank from affecting private sector expectations  while  full trans- 
parency makes the interest rate uninf ormative since the central bank has 
revealed everything  that it knows.  We show  that the result by M&S  - 
that opacity can be optimal -  depends  on two assumptions:  that all sig- 
nals are drawn from the same distribution and, as shown by Woodford 
(2005), that the social welfare function ignores the negative  externality 
associated with individual  price dispersion. Similarly, we show that the 
result by Woodford (2005)  -  that full transparency dominates -  also de- 
pends on two assumptions: that all signals are drawn from the same dis- 
tribution and that the negative  externality  associated  with  individual 
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Allowing for uncertainty  regarding the precision of private signals 
profoundly  changes  the picture.  Because  it misjudges  private  signal  pre- 
cision, the central  bank operates  in sort of fog. As a result,  its optimally 
chosen interest rate is in fact socially suboptimal. This makes partial 
transparency  regimes  less desirable  since  the central  bank's  ability  to op- 
timally shape private expectations  is impaired.  In this case, there is no 
generally  optimal  transparency  regime.  When  the fog is thick  (i.e.,  when 
the misjudgment  of private sector precision has a large variance)  full 
transparency  becomes the most desirable  regime.  Obviously,  as the fog 
gets thinner,  we move back toward the case when signal precision is 
known and partial  transparency  becomes optimal  again. 
This  result  holds whether  the private  sector  knows or not its own sig- 
nal precision.  When the private sector also operates  in a fog because it 
misjudges  its own signal precision,  nothing is qualitatively  changed  re- 
garding the central  bank interest rate decision. The main difference  is 
that private agents caught in the fog make individually optimal deci- 
sions that are in fact socially suboptimal.  Whether  it makes one trans- 
parency regime more preferable  or not depends on the relative actual 
precision  of central  bank signals relative  to private  sector  signals.  Quite 
logically,  the more precise is this actual relative  precision,  the better is 
the central  apt at shaping private sector expectations  and, ceteris  pari- 
bus, the more desirable  is the partial  transparency  regime. 
Obviously,  the present chapter  suffers from a number of limitations 
that  should be kept in mind before  drawing policy conclusions.  To  start 
with, the interest  rate  plays no direct  macroeconomic  role in our model. 
Its only function is to convey some information  about the central  bank 
signals.  While  unrealistic,  this assumption  allows us to isolate  the infor- 
mation  content  of the interest  rate.  If the interest  rate  were to also play a 
macroeconomic role, the central bank would have to trade off the 
macroeconomic  and signaling effects of its monetary  policy decisions. 
This would reduce the attractiveness  of the kind of interest  rate  manip- 
ulation that we focus upon and, probably,  increase  the attractiveness  of 
the full transparency  regime.  Indeed,  under full transparency,  the inter- 
est rate  loses its signal content,  which makes  it entirely  available  to play 
its macroeconomic  role. 
Another limitation  is that we assume that the only source of uncer- 
tainty concerns the economic fundamentals.  It can be argued that, in 
fact,  this uncertainty  is rather  small,  at least in comparison  with our lack 
of understanding  of the true economic model. In that view, the most 
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sense of the model that they have in mind.19  In our framework,  the eco- 
nomic model is subsumed by just one equation.  It is captured  in (1) by 
the term  AO.  We  assume that  vector  A, which captures  the model's  struc- 
ture,  is known while the fundamentals  included in vector 6 are stochas- 
tic. Treating  both A and 6 as stochastic  would be a major  complication; 
it is left for further  research.  One possibility is to invert things:  let 6 be 
known and allow A to be stochastic.  Obviously,  then, this is a matter  of 
rewriting  the story and the results  would qualitatively  survive intact.20 
Finally,  partial  information  here means revealing some categories  of 
information  (the signals,  the interest  rate,  signal precision).  Another  ap- 
proach  would be for the central  bank  to reveal  a subset of each category, 
for example a subset 0*  of k = 1,K with K < n of its signals. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the set of relevant  signals is too large for a central 
bank to ever be fully transparent.  This issue is left for further  research 
but the following remarks  suggest the issues likely to emerge. Under 
partial  transparency,  the central  bank reveals the interest  rate,  which is 
a linear  combination  of its signals. The only difference  between reveal- 
ing the interest  rate  and just one of the n signals is that the interest  rate 
is an optimal  combination  of the signals, which allows the central  bank 
to fashion private  expectations  and thus deal with the common knowl- 
edge effect.  For  that  reason,  revealing  the interest  rate  stands to welfare 
dominate revealing  one signal. It may even dominate revealing two or 
more  signals  but, some way along the road,  revealing  a large  number  of 
signals may dominate.  The larger  is the fog effect,  the more this form  of 
partial  transparency  is likely to be socially optimal. 
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Notes 
1  .  For the sake of completeness,  we note that an important reason for transparency is dem- 
ocratic accountability. We do not pursue this argument further. 
2.  For review of this literature, see Geraats (2002). 
3.  Of course, the central bank can also manipulate  its other signals by not being truthful 
about its information. We ignore such a strategy since it is not sustainable in equilibrium. 36  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and Wyplosz 
4.  This assumption,  which is of no economic interest, simplifies results. 
5.  Hellwig  (2005) allows  for a fifth term -k3 A6(p - A8) in the loss function. This term cap- 
tures the cost of mispricing due to the common knowledge  effect. 
6.  Thus, M&S fully eliminate price dispersion  from the social welfare function  \L{di  while 
Woodford gives it a weight  of r. 
7.  In line with the literature, we treat Var(ek)  as exogenous.  Obviously, central bank signals 
are based on variables that include private sector actions and, therefore, private sector sig- 
nals. Ignoring this dependence  is subject to a Lucas critique since the precision of central 
bank signals  may vary with  the policy  regime and, in particular, on central bank trans- 
parency. We thank Hyun  Song Shin for attracting our attention to this limitation of our 
chapter. 
8.  The assumption can be seen as an extreme characterization of the observation by Wood- 
ford (2005) that "the current level of the overnight interest rates as such is of negligible im- 
portance for economic decisionmaking." 
9.  Formally, the central bank wants  to choose  the jt/s such that /<p;/|x;) 
=  0. When p, = 
p; V*,  ;, (9) shows  that (p;/|x;  is proportional  to y./^  which  is itself proportional  to |x. so 
7((p;/|x.)  is proportional to ;|x; 
= 1 and the |a/s cancel out. 
10. To see this, we use (6) and (8) to write: 
This expression  then becomes 
N  Pj  N 
p 
^> 
i  _ 
= 9,2- ￿￿￿￿  =-=^- 
7=1 „„  % 
/=1 ft  P/ 
11. Indeed,  an intermediate  regime between  partial and full transparency  involves  re- 
vealing  R and 6^  for k =  1, K while  keeping confidential  8^  for k = K +  1, n. In this case, R 
provides  information about the (optimal) linear combination of signals 6^,  k = K + 1, n. A 
partially transparent central bank can always  choose  [Lk  for k =  0, K to mimic the corre- 
sponding  full information and yuk  for k = K 4- 1, n to mimic optimal policy with partial re- 
lease of the corresponding  signals. 
12.  Why can't the private sector communicate  its own precision to the central bank? Con- 
ceivably, it could,  as it could reveal its signals; this would  be welfare improving  since it 
would  eliminate the information heterogeneity  problem. The assumption  that private sec- 
tor information  is heterogeneous  rests on the view  that private sector information is in- Interest  Rate  Signals  and Central  Bank  Transparency  37 
herently  diffuse,  presumably  because  of the multiplicity  of agents,  maybe  also because  of 
their  limited  resources. 
13. Otherwise  we would have to formulate  a hypothesis  on the variances  of uk  and vk  (the 
variances  of the variances  of signals),  a somewhat  far-fetched  variable,  and we could not 
assume  Bayesian  inference  anymore. 
14. Formally,  to a first order of approximation,  we have L0?  -  LFT  =  na[(l -  kja. + 
(1 - r)(l - 2Jt1)p]/(p[a  + (1 - r)p]2)  < 0. The  fog effects  are  of second  order. 
15. All the results  that  follow generalize  to the case  where  the central  bank  also ignores  its 
own precision.  While formally  identical  to the problem  at hand, this generalization  has 
little  economic  justification. 
16. More  precisely,  the presence  of a private  fog raises  the unconditional  expectation  of 
price  dispersion. 
17. When  a, = a. and p, = fy  Vi,j. 
18. The release  of some optimally  chosen signals would provide the central  bank  with a 
similar  tool. We  have not examined  this issue, which is left for further  research. 
19. This  is the point made  by our discussant,  Charles  Bean. 
20. We  have  not chosen  this  route  because  it has  proven  convenient  to normalize  A by set- 
ting Ak  = 1 V/c.  We  could normalize  the fundamentals  and set Qk  = 1 V/c,  but we find this 
approach  unappealing.  Indeed,  it becomes  unclear  what the fundamentals  are if they are 
all constant  and equal. 
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Appendix 
Losses When  Private Sector  Variances  are  Known 
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Proofof(6) 
Given (5),  2 implies:  " 
R 
~ 
pi = (l-r)f,r»F[E»(AQ)]  = AM-^- 
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-  M'/-l7'->r  i >  1,/or/  >  1 
A = (l,...,l)  lXn. 
A straightforward computation  of AM(l-r)/(l-rM)  leads to (6). 
Proof of the results in Section 3.5 
Under partial transparency, using (6), we have: 
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so that the central bank will minimize: 
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Noting  that  this  expression  can  be  written  (1 -  /ca)n/p +  [K/(I^=1|x^)] 
and  recalling  the restriction  IJ=1|xfc  =  1, it follows  that the first order  con- 
dition  implies  ^  =  1/n. 
Using  Kronecker's  h(j, the  second  order  conditions  requires  that  the 
(n -  1) X (n -  1) matrix  with  elements 
82  (1 +  8,7)[(1 
- 




p[«  +  (1 - 
r)p]2(Z«=1  jt2)2 
be positive  semidefinite.  This  condition  is satisfied  if (1 -  kr)a +  (1 -  r) X 
(1 -  2/c^p >  0. If not,  the  minimum  is achieved  for some  |xfc  =  ±°°  with 
signs  such  that  [ik =  1. 40  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and  Wyplosz 
Proof of (15) 
In  what follows, we use the constraint  S]J=1  |xfc  = 1 to eliminate  |xM.  We  first 
compute the optimal policy parameters  \i,k  = |xf 4- mk  around the sym- 
metric  equilibrium  (xf = 1/n when the private sector  signal precision  is 
known. These parameters  are such that dL^/d^ = 0 for all k = 1, n - 1. 
A second order  expansion  of this condition  around  the symmetric  equi- 
librium  yields for all k = 1, n - 1: 
n-l  92£/T  n  /  ^J^PT  d2LPT \ 
gm<a^M^ 
+  ^) 
=  0  (A1) 
where the second order  derivatives  are  evaluated  at the symmetric  equi- 
librium  Gtfc  = a, Pfc  = p, |xf = 1/n, which assumes that the second order 
condition is satisfied.  Defining m, u, and v as the vectors of mk,  uk,  and 
vk, respectively,  the first order conditions can be rewritten in matrix 
form: 
[92^]m  + [3JL"]u  + [dlLPT]v  = 0, 
where we define [3£L% = (PL^/d^),  [^  = (d'L^/d^da) and 
[3gL^  =  (d^^/a^app.  Denoting matrix N« = -^LT  [3jn  and 
Np = -[d^L*"7]-1  [dpL^Hr  the optimal  policy is therefore  characterized  as: 
m = Nau + N^v,  (A2) 
that  is, mk  = If^N^Uj + Ngp;.).  Since  we have eliminated  \in  the matrices 
Na and Np  have size n-l  Xn. 
Close to the symmetric  equilibrium,  using the condition [ik  = 1, we 
have: 
ai/7  a + P(l -  r)(l -  2Jta) 
3LPT  a + p(l -  r)(l -  2Jta) 
8^- 
= 2(1 -  r) « 
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~ 8'> 
y  „.  (1 + 8,)((1 -  fc^la2  -  2[a + (1 -  r)p]a( + (1 -  r)ap)  2 
a^M,  P[a + (l-r)p]2 
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Using (A2),  we get: 
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which applies to k = 1, . . . , n since the constraint  X |xfc  = 1 can  be used to 
compute mn. 
We use these results to compute E[LRPPT(|x')]  - If7. When the central 
bank  believes that  private  sector  precision  is P' = p + v', under interest 
rate  and precision  partial  transparency  it optimally  chooses |x'  = |x + m', 
which delivers social loss L^^dx'). The second-order  development of 
E[LRPPT  (ji')] around  L^ (^) is: 
n-ln-l  32J[jPT/|lJL\  = ^(m-)  + II  a  ^  E[(m;  - m,)(m;  - m;)], 
,=1 y=i  O^-O^- 
which implies: 
eil"" (m.')1  -!."  = rr,1;.-,1  ^^  £[(m-'  " m')(m''  " m')] 
Using (A2),  we get: 42  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and  Wyplosz 
E[L^(y,')  -  L"l = ^Li  -^^Nf,N3F^ 
(A3) 
+ [L"(m.)  -  L"]. 
Moreover,  a second order  expansion,  using (Al), shows that: 
2,--i'  dM-jOJi; 
Now, at the second order, we  can show the following identities 
around the symmetric  equilibrium: 




+  ""' 
a2^-!/7) 
a«,aa;. 
+  2y'"'  aP^  J 
_  1  ap(l  -  r)2{a  + (1 -  r)p + fc,[a  -  2(1 -  r)p]} 
2n  [a + (1 -  r)p]4 
-  M,  »,- 
-  l> \Z] 
a  - 
3  jj 
I""1  d2 
~7  2  '  7-i1TT~LPr(»JL)w'fn>  '  2 ,=i  ' 
dp-jd^ 
' 
= ￿￿￿￿  Pad ~ rf ￿￿￿￿  fa + p(l -  r)(l - 
2fc,)]2  ￿￿￿￿ 
2«[(1 -  fc,)a  + (1 -  2fc,)(l 
￿￿￿￿ 
-  r)W  [  [a + (1 -  r)p]2  J 
1 w  92 
= ￿￿￿￿  pa(l-r)2  [a 
+ p(l -  r)(l -  2fc,)  |2 
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We use these relationships in (A3) to obtain: 
ir[1H1  n- in-  l  yi^-pi)  1 
I  ￿￿￿￿  pi  n- in-  l  ￿￿￿￿  v v  I 
2t|_'=u=1 
pi  n- in-  l  ￿￿￿￿ 
dn,a^,  "J 
v v  I 
i  f  a^-L")  a2^-!/7)  w-l")!  +-  +  F \"-ln-17>  v -  ￿￿￿￿  +  uu -  ￿￿￿￿  +2U'Vi  +  2m  v -  ￿￿￿￿  +  +- 
2t\r1MVp' 
F \"-ln-17>  v -  ￿￿￿￿ 
W^ 
+  uu  <; 
-  ￿￿￿￿ 
5«,aa;. 
+  +2U'Vi  2m  v -  ￿￿￿￿ 
ftjkt,  J 
=  2Ml-r)2  U  + 
pq-rKl-^)^ 
2[(1 -  J>  + (1 -  2*0(1 -  r)p]  1  [a + (1 -  r)p]J  J 
￿￿￿￿  "  (1 -  rfa2k\  ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿  " 
2[(1 -  kja  + (1 -  2fc,)(l  -  r)p][o 
￿￿￿￿ 
+ (1 -  r)p]4n 
X apE [?.,;.,(«, - 
up 
-  v, - 
vfi)2]. 
Now define the fog effect  as F with 
P  = E  ￿￿￿￿  -  A^i ￿￿￿￿  _  . 
With  this definition,  we have: 
E[LRPPT(jji')]-LfT  = 
1  oKl-ry 
2[a + 
p(l-r)(l-^-^P-a^ 
n [a + (1 -  r)p]4  2[(1 -  fc.)  a + (1 -  2*,)(1 -  r)p] 
It follows  that E[LRPPT(\i,')]  -LFT>0  when 
F>L  ￿￿￿￿  ^1  ￿￿￿￿  >_^. 
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To  obtain (15),  we note that a/p  + (1 - r)(l -2kl)>0  when (11)  is satis- 
fied. Indeed, since 0 < r < 1, this is the case when fca  < 0. When kr  > 0, 
(11)  also ensures that this is the case. 
Proofof(16) 
When precision is known, the loss under the partial transparency 
regime is: 




The first term corresponds  to the deviation of prices from their fun- 
damentals.  Denoting  L(|x)  the second term,  which corresponds  to signal 
heterogeneity,  we rewrite  the loss as: 





where c = 1 - r. 
The same decomposition applies to the interest rate partial trans- 
parency  regime  when private  sector  precision  is unknown to the central 
bank. 
Similarly,  when private sector precision is unknown to the central 
bank, the loss corresponding  to the interest rate partial transparency 
regime: 
e [l*^',  &]  = 
ceIL^Xr 
- ulAn  + £ [Lift] 
where 
/  [  ^4^  }2  \ 
Note that L(ji)  now is a stochastic  variable  because, since the private 
section precision is stochastic,  the central  bank's choice of the interest 
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Recall  that  R = IjJ=1|x^  is the interest  rate  actually  chosen by the cen- 
tral  bank  based on its estimate P' of private sector  precision.  We define 
R  = E£=1  jl^fy  as the notional  interest  rate  that  the private  sector  would ex- 
pect if it could observe  the central  bank  signals Qk  based on its own guess 
Pof P'. We  make this mismatch  explicit  by rewriting  the previous equa- 
tion as: 
eil*^', ji)]  =  ce\ 




where we define E[Lrppt({l)]  as the unconditional  expectation  of the loss 
that would have occurred if the central would have chosen, and an- 
nounced, the notional interest  rate  Rand P'. Collecting  the expressions 
above, we have: 
E  [LRPT  (m/,  iL)  - LRPFT  (iif)]  = E  [LRPPT  (£)]  - E  [LRPPT  fa')]  (A4) 
+c4(""if)(R"*""i'i*8*)]2 
-c£|L^j(R-;=1iiA)|2 
hhh  aw** 
; 
+cE^=1^(R-^1jiA)J2 46  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and  Wyplosz 
The first  term  has already  been shown to be positive when (11)  is ver- 
ified. It remains  positive even when (11)  is not met, at least when evalu- 
ated around  the correspond  optimum.  The last two terms  can be evalu- 
ated as follows: 
we can evaluate 
^[(^"-f  )(R  " 
Z?=^'A)]2  " 
cE[(z^1f)^  ~ 
^"=^A)j2 
at the second order  approximation  as follows: 
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E[LRP^',  H)  - L*™fo')]  =  ceII  £f  )  [|>t 
- K)e]  V  (A5) 
,=1 ;=i  jt=l  OfX^fX; 
+  ciE[(tfk?-iLJ)]i  k-i L\;=i ^/  Ja  k-i L\;=i ^/  Ja 
+ lulu  la  g  -)  ^ik^j^Pk 
+#[(if)w-4 
The first  term  is positive and infinitely  large  with respect  to the two last 
ones. As a consequence, E[LRPT([Lt  ,fL)  -  I/^dx')]  >  0, as claimed in 
the text. This result evidences the role of the bias y^  -  [i'k  between the 
parameters  chosen by the central  bank |x^  and those [lk  guessed by the 
private sector. Note that the proof is independent of whether (11) is 
satisfied or not. (The result remains valid for c =  0, i.e. r =  1, since 
Z^^^^^L^^lAa^fjipjNINPF^^  > 0.) 
Proof of (17) 
When  the second order  condition  (11)  is satisfied,  the central  bank  still 
chooses |x[ = 1/n + m'k.  Then (A3) formally  holds but the last term be- 
comes EJL^dx)  - L"]. Indeed, If7^) - If1 is now stochastic  because the 
private sector mistakenly believes that the central bank estimate of 
private  sector  signals is P"  whereas it really is p. Using the expressions 
given above for the losses when private sector precision is known to 
both the central  bank  and the private  sector,  we expand £[LRPPT(|x)  - LFT] 
using the results  from Proof  of (15)  to get: 48  Gosselin, Lotz, and Wyplosz 
r  r  ^>-'  r_!!L_  n 
^>-'  p, +  p,"  2 
=s*n<i-r)  M I  y. .^izi+m  +  f  "*  M I  L^'M  y.  a, 
+ 
P,  +  i^J "* 
^-pf  + p;  2i  I 
+ (1-*,)  1-  /i_r  !  \  Tf 
n r  r  ex  I2 1  " 
?iE(1 
~ T)  |_a,  +  (l-r)Ot 
ex 
+  ^')J  ^ 
Developing this expression to the second order around v"k  = 0 and 
computing  the expectations  yields: 
y»  ifi.  -1 
A=1  y» 
P,  2  ,2 
J>-^\  a, +pJJ "* 
yn )t[v\  "I 
+ (l-fc.)  1-  /l-r  1\  ^~ 
L  2"-|t^  «,  pJJ  J 
where we have replaced  |x;'  with 1  In and c^,  Pfc  with a, p in the last term. 
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V' 
P,  21  . 
^-k.)  ^  ￿￿￿￿ 




,,'2|  ￿￿￿￿ 
«,  pJJ 
I  Pit 
J 
-§E  1(1 
- 
r)U+a-r)pJ  ^ 
+  (1  - 
H-.+a-^J  p:| 
= £[L^(n')-L^CBonly. 
Defining the private  sector fog G such that G2  = E[J%=lGftvk/  $)2],  we 
finally  find: 
E[L«orr(v.')  ~ LFT\Mh  = E[L*™ (ji/) - 
L"lcB«.y  (A^) 
(l-^a  + d-rjp^  n -  1 
-(1-^P  [« + (l-rW 
°2- 
as asserted  in the text.  Adding private  sector  imperfect  knowledge of its 
own precision  introduces  a new source of uncertainty  captured  by the 
terms  v"k. 
The  additional  effect  created  by the assumption  that  the private  sector 
believes that its own signal precision is P"  is captured by the second 
term. If this term is positive, resp. negative, interest  rate and precision 
partial  transparency  becomes more, resp. less, desirable  than when the 
private  sector  knows its own signal precision.  This establishes  (17). 
Proof of the result in Section 5.2 
We show that the result E[Lrpt(|jl',(1)]  >  E[Lrppt(|jl')]  obtained when 
private  sector  precision  is unknown to the central  bank only also holds 
when it is also unknown to the private sector.  In brief, the additional 
source of uncertainty  affects E[LRPPT(\x)]  and E[LRPPT(|x')]  in nearly the 
same way so that the sign of the difference  between these two terms is 
unaffected. 
Formally,  following the same approach  as for (A4),  we have: 50  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and Wyplosz 
E [L«rr(W, (L)  ~ LRPPT  (fOLth  = {EV^iM  ~  £[LRPPr(^')])bo,h 
Next, we note that (A6) holds  at the second  order of approximation 
when replacing |x' with ji: 
E [L*™(iL)  -  LFr\Mk  = E [L*PPT(iL)  - 
L"]CBoniy 
Subtracting these two equations, we find: 
E [L*™UL)]  -  E [^"-(m-'JU,  = E[LRP^(pi)]  - 
EIL^^M-'Jla,^ 
and: 





Using (A5),  we evaluate the terms  in this expression: 







C-E[(;4)2(^  "  H"™ 
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nyL,  F\I  RPT(lLf  \\L  \L)  lL)-J  L,  RPPT(lLr)]  \\k  =\n-ln  ￿￿￿￿  ^J-L- ™  AJp  XTO  r2jy2  kUk  nyL,  \\L  ,  \L)  lL)-J  L,  \\k  ;jboth  =\n-ln 
Z*j=\k=\  ^m  9n 
™ ik™  jkr kUk 
+ 
c^1£[0?]£^;=1^V,-^)2jboth. 
As before, the bias term c2J.1E[eaE{[I;asl(9;./  pLp]^^  - ix^)2}  is infinitely 
larger  because  6 is uniformly  distributed.  As a consequence  E[LRPT(|x'  ,fL) 
_ I/^^duOlboth  > 0' which proves our assertion.  This  conclusion  has been 
established  irrespective  of whether  condition (11)  is satisfied  or not. 